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Time and commitment: the grammaticalization 
of uúch in Lakandon Maya
Henrik Bergqvist*
The paper accounts for the grammaticalization of uúch, (‘previously’, ‘long ago’) 
from a one-place predicate in Yukatek Maya meaning ‘to happen’, to a cognate adver-
bial in Lakandon Maya denoting ‘knowledge asymmetry’; a change from subjective 
‘time’ to intersubjective ‘knowledge’. The paper proposes an analysis of uúch and 
the contrasting kuúch/ka’ch as operators of second-order stance, using a Jakobsonian 
model for analyzing verbal categories forwarded by Paul Kockelman (2004) to 
operationalize the notion of stance, as visible in Q’eqchi’ modals. Intersubjectiication 
as a process of language change aligns with Kockelman’s original suggestion that 
irst-order stances may be embedded to produce second-order stances, i.e. “stance 
about stance”. [Key words: Lakandon Maya, grammaticalization, intersubjectivity, 
shifters, event-type, commitment.]
Tiempo y compromiso: la gramaticalización de uúch en maya lacandon. El artículo da 
cuenta de la gramaticalización de uúch (“anteriormente, hace tiempo”), un morfema 
que pasó de ser, en maya yucateco, un predicado monario con el signiicado “suceder” 
a ser, en maya lacandón, un adverbio cognado que denota asimetría de saber, es decir 
sufrió un cambio del tiempo subjetivo al saber intersubjetivo. Se propone que uúch 
y su par contrastivo kuúch/ka’ch funcionan como operadores de posicionamiento 
(stance) de segundo orden. El análisis se basa en un modelo jakobsoniano aplicado a 
las categorías verbales que fue incrementado por Paul Kockelman (2004), a partir del 
estudio de los modales del maya q’eq’chi’, para volver operatoria la noción de posi-
cionamiento (stance). La intersubjetivización es un proceso de cambio lingüístico que 
se alinea con la sugestión original de Kockelman, según la cual los posicionamientos 
de primer orden pueden imbricarse para producir posicionamientos de segundo orden, 
es decir transformarse en “posicionamientos sobre posicionamientos” (stance about 
stance). [Palabras claves: maya lacandon, grammaticalisación, intersubjectividad, 
conmutadores (shifters), tipo de evento, compromiso.]
Temps et engagement : la grammaticalisation de uúch en maya lacandon. L’article 
rend compte de la grammaticalisation de uúch (« autrefois, il y a longtemps »), un 
morphème correspondant, en maya yucatèque, a un prédicat à une place signiiant 
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« survenir » et devenu, en maya lacandon, un adverbe cognat qui dénote une asymétrie 
de savoir, c’est-à-dire qui a connu un passage du temps subjectif au savoir intersub-
jectif. L’article propose d’interpréter uúch et sa paire contrastive kuúch/ka’ch comme 
des opérateurs de positionnement (stance) de second ordre, une analyse qui se fonde 
sur le modèle jakobsonien appliqué aux catégories verbales, et augmentée par Paul 
Kockelman (2004), à partir d’une étude des modaux du maya q’eqchi’, pour rendre 
opératoire la notion de positionnement (stance). L’intersubjectivisation est un processus 
de changement linguistique qui s’inscrit dans la proposition originale de Kockelman, 
selon laquelle les positionnements de premier ordre peuvent être imbriquées pour 
produire des positionnements de second ordre, à savoir des positionnements sur des 
positionnements (stance about stance). [Mots-clés : maya lacandon, grammatica-
lisation, intersubjectivité, embrayeurs (shifters), type d’évènement, engagement.]
Introduction
The paper traces the grammaticalization of uúch1, (‘previously’, ‘long ago’) 
from a one-place predicate in Yukatek Maya to a cognate adverbial in Lakandon 
Maya. The change in function and meaning that has occurred in uúch is from 
subjective to intersubjective meaning, i.e. subjective ‘time’ to intersubjective 
‘knowledge’. This process can be viewed as a grammatical mapping onto the 
forms kuúch/ka’ch (‘previously’, ‘a while ago’), which are cognate to forms 
found in Colonial and Modern Yukatek2. Semantically, the contrast between uúch 
and kuúch/ka’ch is between states and events that are exclusive knowledge to 
the speaker (uúch) and those that are assumed to be shared knowledge between 
the speaker and the addressee (kuúch/ka’ch). The basic contrast between uúch 
as a marker of knowledge asymmetry and ka’ch as a marker of knowledge 
symmetry can be seen in Examples (1) and (2), which are from a procedural 
narrative about making traditional Lakandon baskets:
(1) a–uúch–ik ma’ inw–eer u–chuhn–a’ 
det–before.excl–adv.foc neg1 1s.a–know 3s.a–begin–mpass
‘Before, I didn’t know how it was begun (tying a basket)’
(2) a–ka’ch–ik ma’ inw–eer u–chu’un–u’
det–before.incl–adv.foc neg1 1s.a–know 3s.a–begin–cpass
‘Before (as I have told you), I didn’t know how one begun.’ (HB041025_ChN_1)
In (1), the speaker informs the addressee (i.e. the author of the present paper) 
of her previous inability to start tying a basket. After having detailed how 
1. The orthographic conventions used in this paper follow the Oficial Mayan Orthography 
(England and Elliot 1990).
2. kuúch/ka’ch are not suggested to have the same origin/status in Yukatek. They do have 
an identical function-meaning in Southern and Northern Lakandon, respectively.
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she eventually acquired this skill, she repeats essentially the same statement 
(2) assuming that the addressee has heard and remembers this, given his stated 
interest in learning about how the speaker ties baskets. uúch and ka’ch thus 
refers to the speaker’s assumptions regarding the addressee’s access to knowl-
edge about an event/state that took place at some unspeciied time in the past.
Following a discussion of these forms, the paper goes on to explore uúch 
and kuúch/ka’ch as a form of epistemic marking, which may be accounted 
for using a Jakobsonian (Jakobson 1990 [1957]) model of (epistemic) stance 
forwarded by Kockelman (2004, 2010) in his analysis of epistemic modality 
in Q’eqchi’. Using this analytical model, uúch and kuúch/ka’ch are argued 
to signal a “secondary stance” where the speaker’s commitment to an event 
includes assumptions regarding the addressee’s commitment to the same event 
as either non-shared, or shared.
Lakandon Maya is spoken in the lowlands of southeastern Chiapas, Mexico 
by around 900 speakers. There is a relatively high degree of bilingualism for 
men but much less for women over 30 years of age. Lakandon is one of the 
four existing Yukatekan languages and is divided into two dialects: Southern 
Lakandon (SL), spoken in and around Lacanjá Chan Sayab and Northern 
Lakandon (NL), spoken in the area of Najá.
The Lakandon data presented in this paper was recorded and processed by 
the author between 2003 and 2007, irst under the auspices of the Project for 
the Documentation of the Languages of Meso-America (PDLMA, http://www.
albany.edu/pdlma), and later as a documentation of Lakandon Maya funded by 
the Endangered Languages Documentation Programme (ELDP, http://www.
hrelp.org; grant IGS0038). More recent research on these materials was funded 
by the Swedish Research Council (grant 2011-2274) and a post-doctoral grant 
from Åke Wiberg stiftelse. The author gratefully acknowledges this support.
Several genres are represented in the materials: conversation, traditional 
storytelling, personal narratives, and expository discourse, with a bias towards 
traditional storytelling and personal narratives. The collected language materials 
consist of some 30 hours of recorded speech (audio) of which about 15 hours have 
been transcribed and (partly) analyzed. About 3 hours of video was recorded. 
The materials are archived with the ELAR in London (http://elar.soas.ac.uk/).
A note on grammaticalization
Grammaticalization is a process of language change whereby content words 
become function words (e.g. Bybee et al. 1994). It is generally viewed as a 
cyclical and unidirectional process where different stages of grammaticalization 
are achieved. The unidirectional aspect of this process has been questioned 
(e.g. Campbell 2001), but it may in any case  be regarded as a strong tendency. 
An example of grammaticalization is seen in the development of the ‘future’ 
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will/’ll in English where will historically was a verb of volition (OE willan 
‘want’, ‘wish’), still visible in the somewhat archaic phrase, do what you will. 
It then acquired the status of an auxiliary with modal semantics (‘intention’) 
overlapping with tense meaning (‘future’). In a later stage of development, will 
has been reduced to the clitic ‘ll, signaling only the tense meaning (‘future’).
Identiied stages of this process are “semantic bleaching”, “morphological reduc-
tion”, “obligatoriication”, and “phonetic erosion”. These sub-processes detail the 
loss of “concrete”, lexical content in a morpheme that is becoming grammaticalized 
(semantic bleaching), the shortening and changed grammatical status of a morpheme 
in the grammar of the language (morphological reduction/obligatoriication), and 
phonetic changes such as loss of stress (phonetic reduction). The resulting stages 
of grammaticalization are only visible in a full cycle and are not realized in every 
stage, nor with every morpheme subject to the grammaticalization process.
The notion of semantic bleaching is accompanied by the acquisition of a new 
function, which may be semantically less concrete than its previous lexical mean-
ing, but often predictably related to the original meaning of a form. Cross-linguistic 
tendencies have been observed for the development of members of categories 
such as tense, aspect, mood/modality, and evidentiality. Perhaps the most salient 
of these tendencies is their origin in verbs, e.g. say may become grammaticalized 
to signal ‘reported speech’ and inish to express the aspectual ‘perfect’.
Once a form has acquired a grammatical function, it can then develop new 
functions that are related to the original one. The cross-categorical gram-
maticalization of forms where e.g. aspect markers may become tense markers 
or evidentials is an example of this (e.g. Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986 for 
Turkish miš). Partly, this categorical transfer may be attributed to the fuzzi-
ness of categories in an analytical sense, but there are some cross-linguistic 
tendencies with regard to the way markers may acquire characteristics 
outside of their category membership resulting from the “conventionaliza-
tion of implicatures” (Levinson 2000; see ‘invited inferences’, Traugott 
and Dasher 2002). Implied meaning thus becomes encoded in forms from 
conventional patterns of use, as visible in the development of perfects to 
become markers of past tense, or alternatively marking inference, depending 
on language speciic circumstances.
A less well-explored grammaticalization process is observed by Traugott and 
Dasher (2002), namely the “intersubjectiication” of modals and forms of social 
deixis (e.g. Fr. tu/vous). This process details how a ‘subjective’ expression 
(e.g. a modal marker) expands the speaker’s point-of-view to also include the 
addressee’s point-of-view. Traugott and Dasher discuss this development in 
the context of how epistemic markers acquire discourse functions and develop 
into discourse markers. The intersubjective meaning attributed to such forms 
is thus contingent on their function to relate aspects of the speech situation and 
the perspectives of the speech participants.
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The cross-categorical transfer of meaning and more speciically the intersub-
jectiication of expressions of subjectivity have signiicance for the proposal 
forwarded here and in the sections below, I will detail how these processes can 
be seen in the grammaticalization of uúch in Lakandon.
uúch in Yukatek
In this and the following section, the grammaticalization of uúch is outlined 
by comparisons between all four spoken Yukatekan languages. In Yukatek, 
Itzaj and Mopan, cognates of uúch are attested as an intransitive verb meaning 





‘What’s wrong?’ (Bricker et al. 1998, p. 20 [my orthographic adjustments])
Itzaj
(4) b’ix uy–uch–ul a–meyaj–oo’ wa’ye’
what 3s.a–happen–pln.iv det–work–pl here
kil u–k’och–ol a’–mes–il ‘agoostoj
when 3s.a–arrive–pln.iv det–month–nom August
‘What happens to the jobs when the month of August arrives?’ (Holing 2000, 




‘I fought’ (Danziger 1996, p. 395 [my adjusted glossing])
It is also possible to trace the grammaticalization of uúch from a verb to a 
temporal-modal (TM) marker in these languages (see Vapnarsky 1999 for Yukatek; 
Danziger 1996; Ulrich and Ulrich 1971 for Mopan; see Holing 2000 for Itzaj).3
uúch as a TM-marker has the grammatical status of an auxiliary that is placed 
directly before the inlected verb. In this capacity, uúch is restricted to combine 
with the dependent status and cannot be inlected by proper verb morphology 
(see Bohnemeyer 1998; Vapnarsky 1999 for Yukatek). These differences are 
illustrated in examples (6) and (7) from Yukatek.
3. A slightly different development has occurred in Itzaj where uchak has the meaning 




(6) bíin wa uúch–uk–Ø tuka’ten–é
fut hyp happen–dep.iv–3s.B again–top
‘(One day) maybe it will happen again.’ (Vapnarsky 1999, p. 113 [my translation 
and glossing/orthographic adjustments])
(7) le’ iglèesya yàan te´ Sàanta Krùus–o’, 
det church exist loc pl.n–td.dist
uúch men–t–ak–Ø
rem build–trz– dep–3s.B
‘The church in Santa Cruz, was built long ago.’ (Vapnarsky 1999, p. 143 [my 
translation and glossing/orthographic adjustments])
In example (6), uúch is a fully inlected verb, whereas in (7) it modiies the 
verb me(e)n ‘construct’. A further development of uúch in Yukatek is as an 
adverbial that is not restricted to occur before the verbal core.
(8) Aa le’l–o k–in–ts’oon uúch–e’ pixàan! 
excl dem–td.dist inc–1s–shoot before–td.ana soul
‘Oh yes, I was shooting (at it) then, my soul!’ (Vapnarsky 1999, p. 5 [tome 2; my 
translation and glossing/orthographic adjustments])
Descriptions of uúch in Yukatek usually focus on the verbal and TM variants. 
While uúch as an adverbial appears less frequently in Yukatek, the gram-
maticalization process has resulted in different circumstances for the adverbial 
uúch in Lakandon.
uúch in Lakandon
In Lakandon, a cognate to the Yukatek uúch is no longer present in the form 
of an intransitive verb. Given that uúch in the form of an intransitive verb is 
found in all other Yukatekan languages, this must be regarded as a special 
development in Lakandon. Only the TM-marker and the adverbial uúch are 
attested. Example (9) shows the TM-marker uúch and (10) features the adverbial:
Lakandon
(9) uúch–ik saj–ak ma’ maák k–u–na’k–ar 
rem–adv.foc scare–dep.iv neg1 person inc–3s.a–go.up–pln.iv
‘ich uy–atooch ik–nuukir–o’
loc 3s.a–house 1pl.a–ancestors–td.dist
‘Long ago, they were afraid, no one entered the house of the ancestors’ 
(HB040922_1EChK_4)
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(10) uúch–ik k–u–tzikb’a–t–ik–Ø ‘in–miim
before.excl–adv.foc inc–3s.a–tell–tr–pln–3s.B 1s.a–grandmother
‘My grandmother used to tell (me)’ (HB040922_1EChK_4)
While the placement and the actual form of uúch (with the adverbial focus 
marker –ik) is identical in (9) and (10), a differentiation can be made from the 
status marking that uúch combines with. In (9) the dependent status marker –Vk 
prompts an analysis of uúch as a TM-marker, while in (10), the plain status 
marker –ik motivates an analysis of uúch as an adverbial (see Vapnarsky 1999, 
p. 142, for Yukatek).
The adverbial uúch can occupy three distinct slots in the clause, clause initially 
(focused; 10), clause inally (11), and topicalized (12):
(11) aw–eer4 mana’ ch’upraj uúch
2s.a–know neg.exist woman before.excl
‘You see, there were no women before’ (HB040917_1EChK_12)
(12) a–uúch a–teen ti’ ka’n–een ich naja’
det–before.excl det–1s.ind loc live–1s.B in Naja
‘Before, I used to live in Najá’ (HB040915_1GKY_3)
The three functions of uúch, i.e. intransitive verb, TM-marker, and adverbial, 
correspond to different stages of grammaticalization as outlined in Figure 1:
intransitive verb  tense–mood marker  free standing adverbial
Fig. 1 – The grammaticalization of uúch.
Aside from differences in grammatical status, as outlined above, there are 
also differences in semantics and scope with respect to the outlined stages of 
development. Scope differences between the TM-marker and the adverbial 
consist of verbal scope for the TM-marker and clausal scope (propositional) for 
the adverbial. This difference in scope mirrors the one in meaning (see below) 
where the TM-marker is subjective and the adverbial is intersubjective, an 
analysis that aligns with Traugott and Dasher’s (2002) proposal for the process 
of intersubjectiication with modals (Section 2, above). Differences in scope 
between forms may be viewed from how they are affected by negation, i.e. the 
4. A reviewer noted the apparently contradictory occurrence of aweer (lit. ‘you know’) in 
a clause that features uúch as a marker of speaker–exclusive knowledge (below). While the 
distribution and function of aweer is outside the scope of the present paper, I would like to 
add that this expression may be compared to the periphrastic expression you see, which a 
speaker of English could use before going on to explain something (new) to his/her addressee.
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possibility of (semantically) negating a marker as an indicator of scope under, 
or over negation. Consider Example (13):
(13) ma inw–eer uúch
neg 1s.a–know before.excl
‘I didn’t know (back then).’ (uclak, cuando murió mi mamá)
The negated part of the sentence in (13) only concerns the state of ‘knowing’, 
not the time when something is/was assumed to be known by the addressee. 
The TM-marker, however, can be negated, as exempliied in (14):
(14) ma’ uúch–ak taak–een ich Palenque
neg before–adv leave.dep–1s.B loc pn
‘I went to Palenque not long ago.’ (elicited, EChK)
In (14), it is the event time that is negated, i.e. ‘not long ago’, not the event 
itself. With respect to the semantic development of uúch in Lakandon, this is 
illustrated in Figure 2:
event description  temporal meaning  knowledge asymmetry
Fig. 2 – The de-semanticization of uúch.
The change in grammatical status from (full) predicate to adverbial cor-
responds to an increasing abstraction of meaning, where ‘to happen’ becomes 
‘long ago’ (TM-marker) and ultimately ‘past event (assumed to be) unknown 
to the addressee’ (i.e. ‘knowledge asymmetry’; adverbial).5 The notion of 
‘knowledge (a)symmetry’ may be attributed to Hanks (1990) who uses it 
to explore dimensions of meaning in Yukatek demonstratives (Hanks 1990, 
p. 516). More recently, this notion has been used to analyze evidentials and 
the less well-known category “engagement” (see Bergqvist 2008, 2012, 2016; 
Evans 2005; Evans et al. 2017; see Landaburu 2007).
5. A reviewer commented that, from the point of view of Yukatek, the adverbial uúch may be 
argued to have developed directly from the verbal uúch rather than from the TM-marker. This 
suggestion is admittedly possible, although there are a couple of arguments for why I advocate 
the development argued for in the present paper. Firstly, it seems unlikely that a (distant) ‘past’ 
meaning would develop twice with two separate functions (i.e. TM-marker and adverbial). 
Secondly, the increasing degree of abstraction in meaning and grammatical status from lexical, 
to grammatical with a core function, to discourse level meaning corresponds to what we would 
expect from the grammaticalization process, as it is currently understood. The time semantics found 
in the TM-marker are retained in the subsequent development into the adverbial (discourse-like) 
marker. The fact that all three forms co-exist in contemporary Yucatec cannot be viewed as a 
counter argument to the proposed analysis in terms of stages of grammaticalization. The present 
paper shows that the next stage in the grammaticalization cycle has occurred in the disappearance 
of verbal uúch, which is no longer attested as an independent lexical verb.
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The semantic change found in uúch, i.e. from temporal operator to a marker 
of knowledge asymmetry, must consider a comparison to the semantically 
contrastive particles ka’ch (NL) and kuúch (SL; ‘recently’, ‘a while ago’). 
kuúch has cognates in all Yukatekan languages, whereas ka’ch is only found 
in Yukatek and Northern Lakandon. Kuúch and ka’ch are hypothesized to be 
two variants with one function in Lakandon; kuúch in the Southern dialect and 
ka’ch belonging to the Northern one. McQuown (1967) discusses the meaning 
of cognate forms in Colonial Yukatek, stating that kachi, “refers to a time earlier 
today” and kuchi refers to a time “before today” (McQuown 1967, p. 243). In 
Lakandon, kuúch/ka’ch do not encode a temporal separation between the speech 
event and the narrated event in terms of proximity (see Jakobson 1990 [1957]; 
Section 5, below), i.e. kuúch/ka’ch cannot be used to answer a when-question 
about a past event (Bergqvist 2008, p. 260-261). Instead, the speaker’s assump-
tion about the addressee’s knowledge of a past event constitutes the encoded 
meaning of the forms. As an illustration, compare (11, repeated here), to (15), 
both of which refer to past states/events that happened more than 20 years ago.
(11) aw–eer mana’ ch’upraj uúch
2s.a–know neg.exist woman before.excl
‘You see, there were no women before’ (HB040917_1EChK_12)
(15) in–yuúm cheen b’in u–ka’ ich este chiwahwa kuúch
1s.a–fB only go 3s.a–do loc this(sp.) pln before.incl
‘Only my uncle was going to go to Chihuahua (as you already know)’6  
(HB050328_1KYYM_1)
Example (11) was uttered in the context of telling a story about the history 
of the Lakandones. In this story there are many instances of uúch, one of 
these marking a commentary on the shortage of potential wives for Lakandon 
males in the irst half of the 20th century. The events it recounts were prob-
ably experienced irst-hand by the speaker although this piece of community 
history is commonly presented as personal knowledge, regardless. The cru-
cial contextual component here is that the person who was told this story 
(i.e. the author of the present paper) was not expected to know about these 
historical circumstances.
Example (15), on the other hand, was uttered when the speaker retold a 
story of his uncle’s going to Chihuahua to the author who had failed to get 
the recorder to  capture the story the irst time. kuúch/ka’ch is not restricted to 
appear in repeated utterances, but is often found with them. From Examples 
6. To clarify, the uncle of the speaker did go to Chihuahua in the story, thus ruling out a 
contrastive reading for kuúch (i.e. Only my uncle was going to go to Chihuahua, but didn’t go.).
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(11) and (15), it should be evident that temporality is insuficient to deine the 
semantics of uúch and ka´ch/kuúch.
A salient example of how uúch contrasts with ka´ch in terms of signaling 
differences in the addressee’s knowledge of an event comes from a conver-
sation between Enrique (E; my main consultant) and his aunt Lisa (L). The 
conversation took place in Lisa’s kitchen and was the irst time that Enrique 
and Lisa met in several years, since Lisa lives in Najá and Enrique now lives 
in Lacanjá, having moved away from Najá almost two decades previous to 
this encounter. Both speak the northern variety of Lakandon, hence uúch is 
contrasted to ka’ch in (16):
(16) E: uúch–ik inw–aks–aj inw–oor, 
before.excl–adv.foc 1s.a–awake–com 1s.a–mind
‘I used to be a Christian.’
b’aje’ yaan jum–b’uj k’äb ya’x k’iin tu’ in–p’ät–aj
now.excl exist one–half hand new year where 1s.a–leave–com
‘Now it’s ive years since I left (the faith)’.
L: wa ma’n a–p’ät–ik ka’ch–i
hyp why 2s.a–leave–pln before.incl–adv.foc
‘Why did you leave it?’
E: t–in–chun inw–u’k–ik
com–1s.a–begin 1s–drink–pln
‘I began to drink.’ (HB_050319_1EChK_1)
In the irst line, Enrique answers a question posed by Lisa concerning his 
churchgoing practices, which in this context is equated with the state of Enrique’s 
Christian faith. Enrique uses uúch(ik) in providing Lisa with (new) informa-
tion regarding his lack thereof and the time since he stopped going to church. 
Having assimilated this information, Lisa then asks for the reason why Enrique 
stopped going using ka’ch(ik) to refer to a (stated) event that originates with 
addressee (Enrique) and which she as addressee, now is informed of. Drinking 
is frowned upon by the churchgoing crowd, which is why Enrique decided to 
stop going. He states this reason in the last line.
As already stated, a change from temporal operator to a marker that speciies 
the speech participant’s respective access to knowledge aligns with the notion of 
intersubjectiication, in which the subjective stance of the speaker is extended to 
include assumptions about the addressee’s perspective. A temporal contrast between 
‘long ago’ (uúch) and ‘recently’ (ka’ch/kuúch) has developed into a differentiation 
between what is assumed to be unknown to the addressee (uúch) and known to the 
addressee (ka’ch/kuúch). This development is outlined in Figure 3, below:
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uúch: temporal distance  knowledge asymmetry
kuúch/ka’ch: temporal proximity  knowledge symmetry
Fig. 3 – Semantic changes in uúch and kuúch/ka’ch.
Interestingly, the proposed analysis for uúch and kuúch/ka’ch in Lakandon has 
no synchronic correspondence in Yukatek. According to Vapnarsky (2000), using 
–o’ together with uúch denotes a distance away from the interlocutors as well as 
‘shared information’ (Fr. savoir partagé; Vapnarsky 2000, p. 202). This semantic 
analysis is however dependent on the presence of the terminal deictic –o’, which 
may attach to any deictic form (see Hanks 1990). A past event may be referred to 
using uúch, but reference to the speech participants’ respective knowledge about 
that event is achieved by attaching one of the available terminal deictics (–a’, –o’, 
–e’, or –i’) to the form. The semantics attributed to these terminal deictics in non-
temporal acts of reference, as reported by Hanks (1990), is also appropriate in the 
analysis of time words in Yukatek (p.c., Vapnarsky 2000, p. 200). In Lakandon, 
there is no semantic contrast in terms of knowledge (a)symmetry between attaching 
–a’ or –o’ to uúch. The function of these terminal deictics is to serve as devices 
for event tracking (see Bergqvist 2008, p. 226) and does not indicate the speaker’s 
expectation with regard to the addressee’s knowledge of an event.
Vapnarsky also reports that the semantic value of ka’ch in Yukatek refers to 
a state which is no longer true, or which could have been true but did not occur 
(see Vapnarsky 1999, p. 206-209). While a hypothetical function of ka’ch is also 
attested for Lakandon, an otherwise contrastive function cannot be attributed to 
ka’ch, nor to uúch, meaning that it is not encoded in either forms. These semanto-
pragmatic differences in cognate forms from two closely related languages serve 
to illustrate the diversity of semantic change and the nebulous nature of shifters. 
The synchronic variation found with uúch in Yukatek is perhaps best understood 
in terms of contextualized token-usage, whereas such conveyed meanings have 
crystallized in Lakandon to become encoded in forms.
Lastly, we may briely discuss some of the changes associated with the 
process of grammaticalization as found with the adverbial uúch. Features to be 
considered are: frequency of use, obligatoriness, and paradigmaticity.
In Lakandon, uúch is frequently attested in some genres of speech, especially 
personal narratives. In Yukatek personal narratives, the adverbial uúch occurs 
with comparably low frequency. A quick comparison between Lakandon and 
Yukatek reveals that uúch is present in 82 per cent of the lines (73) in one 
Lakandon narrative, whereas it is found in only 3 per cent of the lines of a 
Yukatek personal narrative (139; see Bergqvist 2008, p. 331-332). While this 
comparison admittedly is impressionistic, it aligns well with other observations 
regarding differences in grammatical status of uúch in the two languages.
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The related issue of obligatoriness is somewhat of a moot point in deining the 
status of uúch given its function to signal asymmetrical access to knowledge from 
the perspective of the speaker. This makes the use of this marker pragmatically 
conditioned and a choice between uúch and a contrasting marker such as ka’ch 
(e.g. Example 16) is not grammatically required in a way comparable to categorical 
expressions, such as tense marking in many European languages. The TM-marker 
uúch, while paradigmatically contrasted to other pre-clitic tense-aspect-mood 
markers, does not reveal a high degree of obligatoriness either.
The morpho-syntactic properties of uúch as a TM-marker are shared by other 
aspectual and modal auxiliaries with the same grammatical function, making 
up a closed paradigmatic set. The adverbial uúch shares morpho-syntactic 
properties with other particles and free-standing adverbials, most notably ka’ch/
kuúch, although these have been less well-charted than the TM-markers in 
grammatical accounts of Yukatekan languages. Not all auxiliaries that align 
grammatically with the TM-marker uúch have a comparable free-standing 
adverbial form, meaning that such developments are not automatic. We may 
also note here that uúch and ka’ch/kuúch cannot co-occur in the same clause in 
Lakandon. Such co-occurrence is, however, possible in Yukatek with respect 
to uúch and ka’ch. The paradigmaticity of the adverbial uúch and ka’ch/kuúch 
is further discussed in Section 6.
Given the observed changes in the grammatical and semantic status of uúch, 
one may argue that the adverbial uúch has become a form of epistemic marker. 
In Section 6, I will detail how this development results from the function 
of both the temporal and the epistemic uúch as related species of “shifters” 
(Jespersen 1922; see Hanks 2012 for a discussion of evidentials as shifters). 
Before this discussion, I introduce an analytical model that allows for an 
account of epistemic marking on the illocutionary level (see Jakobson 1990 
[1957], below).
A Jakobsonian model of epistemic marking
Roman Jakobson’s seminal paper “Shifters, verbal categories, and the Russian 
verb” (Jakobson 1990 [1957]) applies a distinction between the narrated event 
(“what is said”) and the speech event (“the act of saying it”) to the analysis 
of categories of the verb in Russian. Jakobson’s proposal was immediately 
applicable to the analysis of categories like tense and person, establishing an 
operational model that echoes in modern functional linguistics, even though 
the model itself is rarely discussed. Jakobson argues for a four-fold separa-
tion between the narrated event (En), the speech event (Es), a participant of 
the narrated event (Pn), and a participant of the speech event (Ps). While this 
analytical model is used to detail verbal categories in Russian, it is applicable 
in principle, to comparable  categories in any language.
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Using this set of oppositions, Jakobson deined ‘tense’ as En/Es, i.e. “the nar-
rated event with reference to the speech event” (Jakobson 1990 [1957], p. 46). 
Implicit to this deinition is the character of the relation between the narrated 
event and the speech event in terms of temporality. ‘Aspect’ (i.e. perfective/
imperfective), by contrast, only concerns the narrated event and is thus deined 
as En. According to Jakobson, aspect makes no reference to the speech event, 
or its participants and is therefore not a shifter like tense.
Mood speciies “the relation between the narrated event and its participants 
with reference to the participants of the speech event” (ibid.,). Following this 
deinition Jakobson elaborates by adding a formulation attributed to Vinogradov, 
who says that [mood] relects the speaker’s view of the character of the con-
nection between the action and the actor or the goal” (ibid.,). This composed 
deinition suggests the subjective character of mood, which has since become 
a key notion in how mood is conceptualized. However, the Russian moods 
that Jakobson detail are restricted to the conditional, injunctive, indicative, and 
imperative moods, thereby limiting the general applicability of his deinition 
given our current understanding of notions that may fall under the label of 
mood in language (see Palmer 2001).
A non-shifter category that speciically concerns the present investiga-
tion is ‘status’, which Jakobson characterizes together with aspect as only 
concerning the narrated event (En) by deining “the logical quality of the 
event”. Distinct notions of this verbal category are exempliied from Gilyak 
(see Nivkh, Russia), namely the afirmative, presumptive, negative, inter-
rogative, and negative-interrogative. From the point of view of contemporary 
conceptions of what would nowadays be called “sentence-type”, or “sentence 
mood”, we may question Jakobson’s deinition of this category. There is a 
well-attested correspondence between sentence-type and speech-acts (see 
Austin 1962) in signaling the speaker’s communicative intention. This sug-
gests strong reference to the speech situation in the function and meaning 
of a sentence-type marker. The speech event must therefore be a relevant 
notion in deining this category as well. One could make the argument that 
a deinition of status (sentence mood/modality) would look quite similar to 
the one Jakobson proposes for tense, namely a narrated event that refers to 
the speech event (En/Es), but that this reference does not involve time, but 
epistemicity and communicative aspects of meaning. Epistemicity in this 
sense would be possible to connect to Jakobson’s characterization of an event 
in terms of “logical quality”; i.e. if something is asserted as true, or not true, 
or if an event is presumed to be true. It is, however, not possible to make a 
formal difference in meaning between temporality and epistemicity in relat-
ing the speech event to the narrated event, using Jakobson’s terminology and 
conceptual apparatus alone (i.e. En/Es).
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A possible solution to this analytical limitation is found in Paul Kockelman’s 
(2004, 2010) work on (epistemic) stance in Q’eqchi’, a Mayan language spoken 
in highland Guatemala. Starting from Jakobson’s original insights concerning 
the link between the narrated event and the speech event in verbal categories, 
Kockelman goes on to pair these with Erving Goffman’s formulation of “speaker 
roles” (Goffman 1981). Goffman proposes a division of the notion of ‘speaker’ 
into different roles, namely author (the one who composes the words), animator 
(the one who speaks the words), and principal (the one who commits to what 
is being said). A prototypical speaker occupies all three roles, but these may 
also be separated, perhaps most readily visible in the separation between the 
author and animator in (direct) reported speech. The utterance John said, “I’ll 
be right over” is uttered by the speaker, who is the animator, but the words 
of the quoted utterance (I’ll be right over) were composed by John (i.e. the 
author) and not the animator. The separation between speaker-roles in terms 
of author and animator maps well onto the narrated event and the speech event 
in Jakobson’s terms (see below).
Using Goffman’s separation of speaker roles to also include the role of prin-
cipal, Kockelman (2004) proposes an addition to Jakobson’s event types by 
adding “commitment event” to the two existing event types (i.e. speech event 
and narrated event). This produces a tripartite division of ‘speaker’ into the 
participant roles principal, author, and animator that maps onto the three forms 
of event types, namely commitment event, speech event, and narrated event. 












Fig. 4 – Correspondence between Kockelman’s event 
types and Goffman’s speaker roles.
Kockelman’s reason for proposing a set of event types that correspond 
to speaker roles stems from the need to concretize the notion of stance, 
which although widely used to discuss both modality and evidentiality, is 
so vaguely deined that it has become useless as an analytical concept (see 
also Kockelman 2008, for a discussion). The logic underlying Kockleman’s 
model for stance is as follows: if a notion like ‘tense’ can be accounted 
for by specifying a relation between the narrated event (the event talked 
about) and the speech event (the utterance) in terms of temporal separation/
overlap (as Jakobson argues), then epistemic modals may be deined in a 
similar way by specifying the relation between the speaker’s commitment/
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belief as contained in the commitment event and the utterance found with 
the speech event. In the default case, the speech event is overlapping with 
the narrated event, although these can be separated along other dimensions 
of meaning, such as ‘time’.
In discussing Q’eqchi’ epistemic modals, Kockelman argues that the com-
mitment event is identical to the speech event when an assertive utterance is 
epistemically unmarked. In terms of speaker roles, this is equal to saying that 
the one who says something (animator) is also the one who is committed to 
what s/he says (principal). The ‘factual’ modal marker pe’ in Q’eqchi’, is the 
modal closest to this default case.
Q’eqchi’
(17) x–Ø–hulak pe’ chaq ewer
pfv–3.SetA–arrive fact hither yesterday
‘He did arrive yesterday.’ (addressee–focused) or ‘He arrived yesterday!’ (speaker 
focused; Kockelman 2004, p. 140 [my adjusted glossing])7
The epistemic modal markers discussed by Kockelman along with their 
encoded semantics are listed in Table 1:
Gloss Meaning
Ø Unmarked In a non–speciied world, speaker is committed 
to the truth of p
pe’ Factive In this world, speaker is committed to the truth 
of p
tana Afactive In a possible world, speaker is committed  
to the truth of p
taxaq Optative In a wish world, speaker is committed  
to the truth of p
raj Counterfactive In another world, speaker is committed  
to the truth of p
moko…ta Nonfactive In a non–speciied world, speaker is committed 
to the truth of not p
Table 1 – Semantic meaning of modal clitics in Q’eqchi’  
(after Kockelman 2004).
7. From the point of view of language use, the instantiation of pe’ implies either an 
opposing stance (e.g. negated) by another person (e.g. the addressee) or a previous, contra-
dictory stance assumed by the speaker. As this paper argues, there are forms that encode 
a stance about other another stance (i.e. secondary stances), namely uúch and ka´ch/kuúch 
(see Section 6, below).
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Kockelman’s analysis of Q’eqchi’ modals emphasizes their different scope 
properties. Kockelman draws attention to distributional and grammatical properties 
of these and arranges them along a cline where the ‘factual’ pe’ has the widest 
scope and the ‘non-factive’ moko…ta has the narrowest scope. However, the 
deinition of meaning inherent to the modal forms in Q’uqchi’ is separate from 
the scope properties of the forms. Scope correlates with semantics, but can only 
be deined against the grammatical status and syntagmatic positioning of a form 
with respect to the predicate and/or the propositional content of the utterance.
Fig. 5 – Scope properties of Q’eqchi’ modals in terms  
of event relations (after Kockelman 2010, p. 125).
The scope properties of Q’eqchi’ modals warrants a separation into two 
groups where pe’, tana, and taxaq form one group and raj and moko…ta form 
a second group. The latter two forms have scope over core operators, such as 
tense and aspect, as well as focus constructions, but not over the illocutionary 
force of the utterance, corresponding to sentence-type. The irst group, featur-
ing pe’, tana, and taxaq are more ambiguous when it comes to scope over the 
illocution, but otherwise share scope properties with raj and moko…ta. The 
common properties of the forms constitute an argument for viewing the group 
of markers as a paradigmatic set. What supports making a separation between 
forms in terms of scope, is that e.g. pe’ can have scope over any of the other 
forms, whereas the reverse is not possible.
An important aspect of Kockelman’s proposal is that a difference in the scope 
properties of epistemic modals (at least in Q’eqchi’) may be translated into “degrees 
of separation” between the commitment event and the speech event. This separation 
becomes visible from the scope properties of the forms, i.e. the wide scope pe’ 
may be conceptualized in terms of an almost complete overlap between the speech 
and commitment event, whereas the form with the narrowest scope, moko…ta, 
signals a greater degree of separation between the two event-types. Kockelman’s 
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analysis proposes that the speaker’s commitment is entailed in all modal forms, 
but that this commitment is relevant to different worlds, thus somewhat bridging 
the gap to traditional analyses of modals as operators signaling possible worlds 
where events can take place. Cross-linguistically, Kockelman’s analysis aligns with 
functional accounts of evidentials (e.g. Hengeveld and Dall’Aglio Hattnher 2015) 
as well as individual descriptions of evidential systems (e.g. Faller 2002), where 
some evidential forms act on the propositional level (i.e. belonging to the narrated 
event in Jakobson’s terms) while others are analyzed as illocutionary modiiers 
(i.e. acting on Jakobson’s speech event).
Application of Kockelman’s model to the analysis of uúch
Before we apply Kockelman’s model to the analysis of uúch and ka’ch/kuúch, 
some comments on his proposal are in order. Firstly, Kockelman’s proposal 
ameliorates problems that (from our current understanding of grammar) allows 
us to differentiate between categories like tense (En/Es) and (epistemic) modal-
ity which requires the inclusion of a subjective component that is dificult to 
represent using Jakobson’s four-way distinction into events and participants, 
although exchanging Es (speech event) for Ps (participant of speech event), to 
yield the formula En/Ps, goes some way to signal this aspect of meaning. By 
drawing on Goffman’s insights on speaker roles, Kockelman makes visible the 
gradual commitment of the speaker in qualifying a proposition as perceived, 
inferred, probable, or possible; notions that belong to the domain of epistemol-
ogy as expressed by modal and evidential forms.
Another aspect of Kockelman’s model may be inferred, namely that the 
commitment event is necessarily present in modeling any operator, or sets of 
operators that involves reference to a speech event. This follows from the fact 
that a speech event necessarily involves a speaker, and that the speaker roles 
of author, animator, and principal underlie any utterance made by a speaker. 
So, even if a category like tense may not encode a distinction between saying 
something and committing to something, it must be assumed to be available 
simply from the existing reference to the speech event.
With a starting point in these observations, we may postulate that the con-
iguration of event-types relevant to the analysis of uúch, is similar to the 
one Kockelman uses to account for Q’eqchi’ modals. This follows from the 
function of uúch as an epistemic marker and an assumed element of speaker-
commitment in uúch alongside its ‘past’ temporal meaning. Issues that need 
to be addressed in this regard are scope differences between uúch and kuúch/
ka’ch and the paradigmatic status of this set of forms.
Starting with the issue of paradigmaticity, uúch and kuúch/ka’ch contrast by 
signaling different knowledge (a)symmetries, vis-à-vis the speech participants. 
However, they display differences in grammatical status, as well as in their 
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semantics. Mostly, these differences may be attributed to the histories of the 
two markers as outlined in Section 4. As stated there, the grammaticalization 
of uúch is from an intransitive (one-place) predicate to an adverbial, via the 
function of an auxiliary TM-marker. This development is not shared by kuúch 
and ka´ch, which are adverbial both diachronically and synchronically. This 
difference is clearly visible in the retained function of uúch to specify a point 
in time, thus making it available to answer a “when-question”, a function that 
kuúch/ka´ch does not have (Bergqvist 2008, p. 261). Predictably, kuúch/ka´ch 
does not function as TM-markers although they of course can be fronted in a 
focused position (see Example 10, for uúch, above).
The question of differences in scope between uúch and kuúch/ka’ch may be 
approached from a grammatical and semantic point of view. Scope is generally 
regarded as a semantic phenomenon that correlates with the grammatical status 
of a marker. An example of this relationship can be seen in the relative placement 
of evidential, modal, and tense markers in languages that have these categories 
in their grammar (see Bybee 1985). The placement of evidentials outside of 
epistemic modals, which in turn are placed outside tense markers (all with respect 
to the verbal core), correlates with how instances of one category may affect (or 
remain unaffected by) a member of another category. In the case of uúch and 
kuúch/ka’ch, it is not possible to morpho-syntactically differentiate the two given 
their identical grammatical status. Furthermore, it is not possible to differentiate 
between uúch and kuúch/ka’ch from their relative placement in a clause since 
they cannot co-occur. However, if one takes into account the semantic content 
of the forms, one may argue that uúch is more like a temporal operator than 
kuúch/ka’ch, which only has epistemic and discourse meaning without encoding 
temporal information. In a paradigmatic sense, however, the temporal feature of 
pastness must be considered inseparable from the meaning of the latter forms. 
This function as temporal operator suggests the partly propositional status of uúch, 
a feature that appears absent in kuúch/ka’ch, which is entirely discourse-like.
If we return to the question of how Kockelman’s proposal can be used to 
represent the function and meaning inherent to the investigated forms, we may 
start with the observation that the commitment event (Ec) and speech event 
(Es) overlap in both forms. Both uúch and kuúch/ka’ch entail the speaker’s 
commitment to what is being said. The difference between the forms consists 
of whether this commitment is shared with the addressee, or not, and does not 
involve “degree of commitment”. Modal notions are commonly expressed by 
TM-markers such as je’ (‘assurative’), or taák (‘desiderative’) in Lakandon, 
as well as in Yukatek. These may co-occur with the adverbial uúch, which 
predictably has scope over aspectual-modal operators.
There is a separation between the speech event (Es) and the narrated event 
(En) in terms of temporality given that propositions marked by uúch and kuúch/
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ka’ch are necessarily ‘past’. This temporal separation is underspeciied with 
regard to temporal distance, however. We may illustrate the event coniguration 
applicable to uúch and kuúch/ka’ch as epistemic markers in the following way:
Fig. 6 – Event coniguration in uúch and kuúch/ka’ch.
In order to make the semantic distinction between uúch and kuúch/ka’ch vis-
ible in terms of a coniguration of event types, Figure 6 needs to be modiied 
to allow for a representation of the difference between shared and non-shared 
commitment.
uúch and ka’ch/kuúch as operators of second-order stance
How do we then, conceptualize the proposed features of uúch and ka’ch/kuúch 
in terms of event coniguration? This requires that we introduce the notion of 
“second-order stance”, or “stance about stance”, as briely discussed by Kockelman. 
A secondary stance may concern the speaker’s stance towards his/her own previ-
ous stance, but may also include other forms of meta-stance (Kockelman 2004, 
p. 143-144). A irst-order stance is conceived by Kockelman as consisting of 
a relation between the commitment event and the speech event in e.g. modals, 
(e.g. She could have arrived), or between the commitment event and the narrated 
event in complement-taking predicates (e.g. I think (that) she has arrived; see 
Kockelman 2004, p. 131-133). Achieving a secondary stance, where one stance is 
embedded in another, is a process that Kockelman leaves largely unspeciied. In the 
context of the present discussion, how could such an embedding be represented?
Without drawing on the notion of stance (for obvious reasons), Jakobson 
analyses “reported evidentials” as “narrated speech events”, i.e. a speech event 
contained within a narrated event (EnEns/Es; see Jakobson 1990 [1957], p. 392). 
If stance is conceptualized as a relation between the commitment event and the 
speech/narrated event, then the embedding of a speech event in a narrated event, 
which in turn is related to a speech event, may be one example of a secondary 
stance. Admittedly, the notion of commitment event is not part of Jakobson’s 
proposal, but as suggested in Section 6, the commitment event may be regarded 
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as underlyingly present as a consequence of the presence of a speech event and 
the deining role of a speaker in that event type (see Section 6, above).
Following Kockelman’s model for representing relations between event 
types, the separation between exclusive and shared knowledge in uúch and 
ka’ch/kuúch can be analyzed as one commitment event embedded in another. 
This is seen in Figure 7:
Fig. 7 – Embedded commitment events as  
second-order stance: uúch and kuúch/ka’ch.
Why should the (assumed) commitment of the addressee be embedded? The 
phrase “in the mind of the  speaker” serves to illustrate this conceptualization. It 
is the speaker’s assumption that is at stake, not the expressed commitment of the 
addressee. The speaker’s assumption in this regard may be well founded or poorly 
supported; a distinction of this kind cannot be found in the investigated forms. From 
the point of view of speaker role, one may observe that the speaker inhabits all three 
roles (author, animator, principal), while sharing only that of the principal with the 
addressee. This must be viewed as the dominance of the speaker’s point of view in 
uúch and ka’ch/kuúch, a proposal that aligns with Traugott and Dasher’s idea that 
intersubjectivity is preceded by, and indeed requires subjectivity.8
8. This relation between subjectivity and intersubjectivity applies to the grammaticalization 
process discussed here, namely the intersubjectiication of forms that originally encode the 
subjective point-of-view of the speaker (e.g. modals and pronouns). It is by no means a 
statement that applies to the ongoing debate concerning the relation between subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity in an ontological sense. However, a brief comment in this regard 
is that what sometimes is called “primary intersubjectivity” (see Trevarthen 1979) as a 
pre-linguistic, cognitive predisposition that makes language acquisition possible, allows 
for the development of the subject’s awareness of him/herself as a subject. Secondary 
intersubjectivity, which concerns the acknowledgement and manipulation of points-of-view 
(i.e. Machiavellian skills) develops later and could arguably be viewed as a consequence 
of the subject’s increasing awareness of him/herself as a subject among other subjects that 
are assumed to share the primary subject’s desires and perceptions. 
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An alternative to an embedding of commitments, i.e. analyzing the addressee’s 
commitment as a commitment independent of the speaker’s own, is dificult 
to maintain given that the addressee’s expressed commitment may turn out to 
differ from the speaker’s assumption, where the speaker’s own commitment 
is entailed. The intersubjective meaning component in uúch and ka’ch/kuúch 
is encoded and on the same level semantically and thus non-defeasible. If we 
compare Traugott and Dasher’s proposal to that of Kockelman, we may regard 
the process of intersubjectiication as the development of second-order stances 
from irst-order ones.
How is this development possible? If we consider the deining feature of a 
shifter to be the necessary reference to the speech event, then this component 
may allow for reference to any available dimensions of meaning that may be 
connected to speaker-roles as relected in the event coniguration proposed by 
Kockelman. A prediction is that categorical expressions that only refer to the 
narrated event are not available for developing second-order stance functions 
without irst developing reference to the speech event. Hence, a ‘perfective’ 
aspect marker (which only refers to the narrated event) may develop into a shifter 
that makes reference to the time of the speech event or the (modal) attitude of 
the speaker, and only then develop into a marker of intersubjectivity. While I 
have come across no accounts that would contradict this prediction, it remains 
to be conirmed, subject to empirical testing.
Summary
The grammaticalization of uúch may be viewed as an instance of intersub-
jectiication, which makes reference to a past event, but also expresses the 
speaker’s assumption that the event referred to is unknown to the addressee. The 
parallel development of kuúch/ka’ch to signal a contrasting stance, namely that 
the speaker refers to a past event that is assumed to be known to the addressee, 
has produced a paradigmatic set of forms in Lakandon grammar. The notion 
of ‘knowledge (a)symmetry’ is used to account for this semantic contrast. 
Differences in the scope properties of the TA marker and the adverbial uúch 
align with their different grammatical statuses, where the TA marker has verbal 
scope and the adverbial has clausal scope.
The second part of the paper proposes that uúch and ka’ch/kuúch can be 
analyzed as markers of second-order stance (see Kockelman 2004). This form of 
stance may be conceptualized as an embedding of the addressee’s commitment 
in the (primary) commitment of the speaker. Additionally, there is a temporal 
meaning component (‘past’) that is analyzable as a separation between the 
speech event (Es) and the narrated event (En), following Jakobson’s original 
formulation of event types. This mode of analysis allows for a comparison 
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of uúch and ka’ch/kuúch to other forms of epistemic marking on comparable 
grounds; shedding some light on the notion of intersubjective stances.*
* Manuscrit reçu en mars 2015, accepté pour publication en octobre 2015.
This article is part of the Special issue Measures and textures of time among the Maya: 
the said, the written, and the lived.
Glossing abbreviations
1: irst person, 2: second person, 3: third person, a: ergative marker, adv.
foc: adverb focus (sufix), af: agent focus, B: absolutive marker, caus: causa-
tive, cl: classiier, com: completive aspect, cp: completive status, cpass: 
canonical passive, dep: dependent status, det: determiner, dist: distal deictic, 
duB: dubitative, enc: enclitic, ep: epenthetic segment, excl: exclusive, exist: 
existential, fact: factual, fut1: event dependent future, fut2: indeinite future, 
imp: imperative, inc: incompletive aspect, incl: inclusive, ind: independent 
form, itv: intransitive thematic vowel, iv: intransitive, loc: locative, neg1: 
negative (dependent), neg2: negative (plain), nmzr: nominalizer, nom: nomi-
nal, opt: optative, ost: ostensive, pen: penative aspect, pl: plural, pln: plain 
status, pln.iv: plain status intransitive, pn: proper noun, poss: possessive, prep: 
preposition, refl: relexive, s: singular, ssdtvcom: status sufix for derived 
transitive verb in the completive, suB: subordinate, term: terminative, tr: 
transitive, trz: transitivizer. the code after the examples corresponds to the 
recording identiication (e.g. hB041025_chn_1: name of person recording_ 
date of recording abbreviation for the speaker’s name_number of recording, 
in case of several recordings on the same date).
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